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Abstract
With vast databases at their disposal, private tech companies can compete
with public statistical agencies to provide population statistics. However, pri-
vate companies face different incentives to provide high-quality statistics and
to protect the privacy of the people whose data are used. When both privacy
protection and statistical accuracy are public goods, private providers tend to
produce at least one suboptimally, but it is not clear which. We model a firm
that publishes statistics under a guarantee of differential privacy. We prove
that provision by the private firm results in inefficiently low data quality in
this framework.
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Traditionally, statistical agencies have been chargedwith publishing summaries
of data collected from the nation’s citizens and businesses. Their data collection
activities are expensive, and at risk of losing funding, despite an increasing de-
mand for reliable data.1 In this environment, one option is to augment, or replace,
public statistical programs with information collected by private companies. In-
deed, companies that aggregate personal data—e.g. Facebook, Google, Apple,
Microsoft, Uber, Upwork—are under pressure to use their vast databases in the
public interest. They are, often in collaboration with academic researchers, de-
veloping innovative data products like Google Trends (Choi and Varian 2012), the
Billion Prices Project (Cavallo and Rigobon 2016), and the University of Michigan
Social Media Job Loss Index (Antenucci et al. 2014). Clearly, the private sector is
capable of producing innovative data products and could provide them competi-
tively to the public.
Why are population statistics provided by public statistical agencies rather
than private firms? There are a number of potential difficulties, but in this paper
we focus on inefficiencies in how private providers trade off data privacy and ac-
curacy. Following the fundamental law of information recovery (Dinur and Nissim
2003), increasing the accuracy of published statistical summaries necessarily re-
sults in a loss of privacy for the data owners. This means statistical agencies must
perform a balancing act. Published statistics should be as accurate as possible
without revealing too much information about any single individual or business.
When the benefits of more accurate population statistics and privacy losses are
shared by all citizens, we show that private provision will result in inefficiently
low levels of data accuracy and inefficiently high levels of privacy protection.
To establish suboptimality of the private provision of population statistics, we
1For evidence of increasing demand for Census data, see the discussion in Ruggles et al. (2019).
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model the problem faced by a private data custodian whowants to sell population
statistics. Our model extends Ghosh and Roth (2015, GR hereafter), who consider
the problem of a data custodian, or producer, with legal possession of confiden-
tial data that was originally provided by data owners. The custodian wants to
sell population statistics based on the confidential data to data users, who need
the statistical summaries sold by the custodian to improve decision-making. We
formalize the tradeoff between privacy and accuracy by assuming the custodian
publishes using a differentially private mechanism. Operating this mechanism to
publish statistics with a given level of accuracy requires the data owners to in-
cur a known and quantifiable loss of privacy. Ghosh and Roth (2015) establish a
minimum-cost method for purchasing privacy-loss rights from the data owners.
Unlike Ghosh and Roth, who treat the demand for accuracy as exogenous, we
assume an endogenous demand for data accuracy, and focus on its implications
for the efficiency of private provision. The producer therefore balances the de-
mand for statistical accuracy against a demand for privacy protection. We model
consumers who have heterogeneous preferences for the accuracy of the published
statistical summaries, as well as for privacy protection. This formulation nests the
more intuitive case in which the users of data are distinct from the population on
whom data are collected.
Our model of data publication is based on differential privacy (Dwork 2006;
Dwork et al. 2006; 2017), which has been adopted by tech companies like Google
and Apple, as well as by the U.S. Census Bureau.2 Differential privacy is an ap-
proach to publishing statistical summaries from confidential data sources that al-
lows the publisher to make explicit, mathematically rigorous, statements about
2See, for example, Erlingsson et al. (2014), Differential Privacy Team (2017), and
Abowd and Schmutte (2019) regarding applications of differential privacy at Google, Apple,
and Census respectively.
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how much privacy—measured as a quantity—is lost with each publication. Fur-
thermore, differentially private publications can induce an explicit positive rela-
tionship between accuracy of the published data and the amount of privacy loss.3
Crucially, we model both privacy protection and accuracy as public goods.
Thus, it is not a priori obvious whether the private provider will provide too much
or too little privacy protection. Data accuracy is a public good, since any con-
sumer may access and use the published data without reducing its accuracy for
some other consumer (it is non-rival) and no consumer can block another con-
sumer’s use (it is non-excludable). In plain English, all persons can learn and
benefit from the use of high-quality data by others, and they can also access those
data directly themselves. They value what they learn. And they understand that
what they learn is more useful if it is more accurate. Privacy protection is also a
public good because all individuals in the database benefit from the same level of
privacy protection embodied in the producer’s data publication process, an im-
plication of the Ghosh-Roth mechanism (non-rivalry in consumption for privacy
protection).
We find that private provision results in suboptimally low data accuracy. As
in Samuelson’s classic model (Samuelson 1954), the external benefit of data accu-
racy to all consumers is not captured by the willingness-to-pay of the consumer
with the greatest private value. By contrast, the demand for privacy protection is
derived from the data provider’s cost-minimization problem. The provider buys
just enough data-use rights (privacy loss) to sell the data accuracy to the consumer
with the highest valuation. All other consumers use the published data for free.4
3For a non-technical introduction to differential privacy, see Wood et al. (2018) See
Heffetz and Ligett (2014) for an introduction targeted toward economists. For a more compre-
hensive treatment, see Dwork and Roth (2014).
4Study of this case may be of special interest for some business-data collection for industries
with a small number of dominant organizations.
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While the suboptimality of private provision of public goods is well-understood
(Spence 1975), modeling the origin and nature of suboptimality in the market
for population statistics is not. Given the adoption of differential privacy by the
U.S. Census Bureau, and the increasing demand for public data products from
tech companies, it is important to consider how markets might, and might not,
appropriately balance society’s interests in privacy protection and data quality
(Abowd and Schmutte 2019). Our paper is also broadly related to recent work in
the economics of privacy (Acquisti et al. 2016; Heffetz and Ligett 2014; Goldfarb et al.
2015), which focuses on the role of privacy in facilitating the efficient use of cus-
tomer data. Few papers have considered the economic tradeoff between privacy
protection and data quality in the production of population statistics. Ghosh and Roth
(2015), on which we build, and related papers in electronic commerce (Li et al.
2014) assume the demand for accuracy is exogenous. In some settings, this is
appropriate—for example, when a company is mining its customer data for in-
ternal use. Publishing data summaries is, as we now show, another matter alto-
gether.
1 Preliminary Concepts
This section provides our formal definitions of privacy and data accuracy. Our
definitions are based on a computer science literature studying formal privacy,
and so may be unfamiliar to economists. Our summary draws on several sources
to whichwe refer the readerwho is interested inmore details (Hardt and Rothblum
2010; Dwork and Roth 2014; Wasserman and Zhou 2010; Heffetz and Ligett 2014;
Abowd and Schmutte 2019). Our notation follows Dwork and Roth (2014).
We introduce the notion of differential privacy, which is key to understand-
4
ing our analysis. Differentially private data publications do not allow an outsider
to learn “too much” about any individual data record based on statistical sum-
maries of the full database. For our purposes, this framework is useful because
differential privacy tells us, for any level of data accuracy, how much privacy loss
an efficient provider must be willing to tolerate.
1.1 Databases and Queries
A data custodian (e.g., Facebook, Google, the U.S. Census Bureau) possesses a
database, D. Think of D as a table in which each row represents information
for a single individual and each column represents a single characteristic to be
measured. The database D contains N rows. We assume all variables are dis-
crete and finite-valued, but this is not restrictive since continuous data are always
given discrete, finite representations when recorded on search logs, email con-
tents, network features, social media posts, censuses, surveys, or administrative
record systems.
The notion of a neighboring database is crucial for the definition of differential
privacy. Differential privacy captures the idea that published output should not
change “too much” based on a single data item. We say database D′ is a neigh-
boring database of D if D′ can be obtained by modifying a single row in D. We
denote by D the set of all admissible databases.5
Data users are interested in learning answers to a database query. A query is
a function, Q : D → RK that maps input databases, D ∈ D to a vector in RK .
The concept of a database query can admit standard population statistics, like
subgroup counts, means, variances, and so on, but is much broader. The case we
5Formally, D andD′ are neighbors if the ℓ1-norm of the difference in their histogram represen-
tations is 2. See Appendix A.1.
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consider in this paper focuses on publication of a single-valued query, but note
that in general the query answer Q(D)may be vector-valued.
1.2 Query Release Mechanisms, Privacy, and Accuracy
The data curator operates a query release mechanism that provides answers to
queries Q given a database D.
Definition 1 (Query Release Mechanism) Let Q be a set of admissible single-valued
queries. A query release mechanism M is a random function M : D × Q →
R whose inputs are a database D and a query Q. The mechanism output is
a probabilistic response to the query. The probability of observing B ⊆ R is
Pr [M(D,Q) ∈ B|D,Q], the conditional probability, given D and Q, that the pub-
lished query answer is in B ∈ B, where B are the measurable subsets of R.
Differential Privacy
Our definitions of differential privacy and accuracy for the query release mecha-
nism follow Dwork et al. (2006) and Kifer and Machanavajjhala (2011). 6
Definition 2 (ε-differential privacy) Query releasemechanismM satisfies ε-differential
privacy if for ε > 0, for all pairs of neighboring databasesD,D′, all queriesQ ∈ Q,
and all B ∈ B
Pr [M(D,Q) ∈ B|D,Q] ≤ eε Pr [M(D′, Q) ∈ B|D′, Q] ,
6Following the setup in Ghosh and Roth (2015), we are using the variant of differential privacy
now known as bounded differential privacy. This means that the total number of records in the
confidential database, called N below, is publicly known.
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where B are the measurable subsets of R, and the randomness inM is due exclu-
sively to the mechanism and not the process generating the databaseD.
Accuracy
We next define our measure of accuracy. For any query, Q ∈ Q, the query release
mechanism returns an answer, a, that depends on the input database, the con-
tent of the query response, and the randomization induced by the query release
mechanism.
Definition 3 ((α, β)-accuracy) Query release mechanismM satisfies (α, β)-accuracy
if for Q ∈ Q and a output fromM(D,Q),
Pr
(
|a−Q(D)| ≤ α
∣∣∣ D,Q) ≥ 1− β
where a,Q(D) ∈ R.
This definition guarantees that the error in the answer provided by themechanism
is bounded above by αwith probability (1−β).7 The probabilities in the definition
of (α, β)-accuracy are induced by the query release mechanism.
1.3 Example
To illustrate the problem stylized by the model, consider the following scenario.
Under Public Law 94-171, the U.S. Census Bureau publishes the number of
individuals of Hispanic origin in each census block. Many blocks have small pop-
ulations. Publishing the size of the Hispanic population without statistical disclo-
sure limitation can lead to disclosure of the ethnicity of individuals in that block.
7This definition also appears in a more general form in Gupta et al. (2012).
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Framed in terms of the model, the database of interest, D, has one row for
each person in a given block, and includes a binary indicator of their Hispanic
origin. A neighboring database, D′, has the same rows, but the Hispanic origin
is changed for exactly one entry. The query of interest, Q(D), is the proportion of
individuals of Hispanic origin in the block. If the Census Bureau publishes the
answer to Q(D) exactly, then an attacker who knows the Hispanic origin of all
but one individual can learn the origin of the remaining individual with certainty.
If, instead, it publishes a noisy proportion under a differentially private query
release mechanism,M(D,Q), such an attacker will remain uncertain of the origin
of the remaining individual. The question is whether the noisy proportion still
measures the true proportion with sufficient accuracy.
In the preceding example, the attribute of interest is a binary indicator. This
may seem to be a restrictive assumption. As we noted earlier, continuous data are
generally given discrete, finite representations when recorded in databases. For
instance, Public Law 94-171 also requires publication of the number of individu-
als in blocks and tracts, classified by age, a continuous feature. However, in the
database D, age is discretized to single years, and for block-level tabulations, to
year ranges. An 52-year old individual is thus recorded as the binary response to
the query “age = 52”. More generally, our model applies for publication of any
predicate query that asks whether an individual’s characteristics satisfy a set of
binary conditions.
2 Private Provision of Population Statistics
In this section, wemodel a data provider selling public statistics produced accord-
ing to a differentially private mechanism by purchasing rights to use records in an
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underlying confidential database. Since accuracy and privacy protection are both
public goods, the consequences of private provision are theoretically ambiguous
until further structure is placed on themodel. Given the structure below, we prove
that too little data accuracy and too much privacy will be supplied by a private
provider compared to the social welfare maximizing solution.
2.1 Model Setup
Each of N private individuals possesses a single bit of information, bi, that is al-
ready stored in a database maintained by a trusted curator.8 In addition to their
private information, each individual is endowed with income, yi.
Individuals each consume one unit of the published statistic, which has accu-
racy I defined in terms of (α, β)-accuracy, that is I = (1 − α). Since I is a public
good, all consumers enjoy the benefits of I , but each consumer is charged the
market price pI , to be determined within the model, for her “share” of I , which
we denote Ii, and the balance of the public good, which we denote I
˜i is paid for
by the other consumers. Thus, I = Ii + I
˜i for all consumers.
The preferences of consumer i are given by the indirect utility function
vi
(
yi, εi, Ii, I
˜i
)
= ln yi + pεεi − γiεi + ηi
(
Ii + I
˜i
)− pIIi. (1)
Equation (1) implies that preferences are quasilinear in data accuracy, I , privacy
loss, εi, and log income, ln yi.
9 We incorporate income and accuracy in the utility
8Trusted curator can have a variety of meanings. Wemean that the database is held by an entity,
governmental or private, whose legal authority to hold the data is not challenged and whose
physical data security is adequate to prevent privacy breaches due to theft of the confidential data
themselves. We do not model how the trusted curator got possession of the data, but we do restrict
all publications based on these data to use statistics produced by a query release mechanism that
meets the same privacy and confidentiality constraints.
9In this section, we keep the description of preferences for data accuracy and privacy protection
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function because they are required for the arguments in this section.
The term pε is the common price per unit of privacy, also to be determined by
the model. The receipt pεεi represents the total payment an individual receives if
her bit is used in an ε-differentially private mechanism. The individual’s marginal
preferences for data accuracy (a “good”) and privacy loss (a “bad,” really an input
here), (ηi, γi) > 0, are not known to the data provider, but their population distri-
butions are public information. Therefore, the mechanism for procuring privacy
has to be individually rational and dominant-strategy truthful.
We do not include any explicit interaction between the publication of statisti-
cal data and the market for private goods. This assumption is not without conse-
quence, andwemake it to facilitate exposition of our key point: that data accuracy
may be under-provided due to its public-good properties. Violations of privacy
might affect the goods market through targeted advertising and price discrimina-
tion. The accuracy of public statistics may also spill over to the goods market by
making firms more efficient. These are topics for future work.
2.2 The Cost of Producing Data Accuracy
A supplier of statistical information wants to produce an (α, β)-accurate estimate,
sˆ, of the population statistic
s =
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi (2)
i.e., a normalized query estimating the proportion of individuals with the property
encoded in bi. This property could be something highly sensitive, such as the
individual’s citizenship status, sexual orientation, or whether she suffers from a
as close as possible to the GR specification. They allow for the possibility that algorithms exist that
can provide differential privacy protection that varies with i; hence εi appears in equation (1).
They subsequently prove that εi = ε for all i in their Theorem 3.3.
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particular health condition.
Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 in Ghosh and Roth (2015) prove that publishing the statis-
tic
sˆ =
1
N

 H∑
i=1
bi +
αN
2
(
1/2 + ln 1
β
) + Lap(1
ε
) (3)
provides (α, β)-accuracy, and requires a privacy loss of εi = ε =
1/2+ln (1/β)
αN
from
H = N − αN
1/2+ln (1/β)
members of the population. Lap
(
1
ε
)
represents a draw from
the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale parameter 1
ε
.
Purchasing the data-use rights from theH least privacy-loving members of the
population; i.e., those with the smallest γi, is the minimum-cost, envy-free imple-
mentation mechanism (Ghosh and Roth 2015).10 GR provide two mechanisms for
implementing their VCG auction. We rely on their mechanism MinCostAuction
and the properties given in their Proposition 4.5. See Appendix A.2 for additional
details.11
We now derive the producer’s problem of providing the statistic for a given
level of data accuracy, I . If pε is the payment per unit of privacy loss, the total cost
of production is c(I) = pεHε, where the right-hand side terms can be defined in
terms of I as follows. Using the arguments above, the producer must purchase
10We note for completeness that the statistic sˆ, while computed on only H cases from the popu-
lation of N , is evaluated relative to the population quantity s. GR use the same accuracy measure
as we do; namely Definition 3 with a single query in the query set, although they assume β = 13
throughout. We restrict the choice of β to β < 1/ (1 +
√
e); the threshold required by the proof
technique in GR, Theorem 3.1. Statisticians often use mean squared error instead of the absolute
error embodied in this definition. Nevertheless, the statistic sˆ also trades-off bias and variance
relative to the correct population statistic. The term αN/ [2 (1/2 + ln (1/β))] is a bias correction.
11Note that the result in equation (3) holds regardless of any correlation between privacy pref-
erences and data values. That is, even if it is biased, the summary produced using data from those
consumers with the lowest privacy preferences still satisfies the accuracy guarantee.
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from H(I) consumers the right to use their data to compute sˆ. Then,
H(I) = N − (1− I)N
1/2 + ln (1/β)
. (4)
Under the VCG mechanism, the price of privacy loss must be pε = Q
(
H(I)
N
)
,
where Q is the quantile function with respect to the population distribution of
privacy preferences, Fγ . The lowest price at which the fraction
H(I)
N
of consumers
do better by selling the right to use their bit, bi, with ε (I) units of differential
privacy is pε. H(I) is increasing in I . The total cost of producing I is
CV CG(I) = Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)ε(I), (5)
where the production technology derived by GR implies
ε(I) =
1/2 + ln (1/β)
(1− I)N . (6)
2.3 Example
The results of Ghosh and Roth (2015) hold even with an arbitrary correlation be-
tween privacy preferences and measured characteristics. Obtaining accuracy in
the presence of potentially extreme selection bias makes it necessary to count al-
most everyone. In practice, the costs of publication are determined by the level of
privacy-loss required, and the preferences of someone with extreme aversion to
privacy loss.
Recall Example 1 from Section 1.3, which involved computing the share of the
Hispanic population in a census block. If an analyst requires (0.2, 0.1)-accuracy in
the estimate, then she must purchase privacy loss of ǫ ≈ 14/N from H = 0.93N
people, or 93 percent of the block population. Note that the required privacy
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loss, ǫ, vanishes as the block size N increases. To obtain a stronger guarantee of
(0.05, 0.05)-accuracy would require purchasing ǫ ≈ 70/N from H = 0.99N people.
A very weak guarantee of (0.4, 1/3)-accuracy only requires privacy loss of ǫ ≈ 4/N
from H = 0.75N people.
3 Suboptimality of Private Provision
Suppose a private profit-maximizing, price-taking, firm sells sˆwith accuracy (α, β),
that is, with data accuracy I at price pI . Then, profits P (I) are
P (I) = pII − CV CG(I).
If it sells at all, it will produce I to satisfy the first-order condition P ′
(
IV CG
)
= 0
implying
pI = Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)ε′(I) +
[
Q
(
H(I)
N
)
+Q′
(
H(I)
N
)(
H(I)
N
)]
H ′(I)ε(I) (7)
where the solution is evaluated at IV CG.12 The price of data accuracy is equal to
the marginal cost of increasing the amount of privacy protection–data-use rights–
that must be purchased. There are two terms. The first term is the increment to
marginal cost from increasing the amount each privacy-right seller must be paid
because ε has been marginally increased, thus reducing privacy protection for all.
12The second order condition is P ′′
(
IV CG
)
< 0, or d
2
C
V CG(I)
dI2
> 0. The only term in the second
derivative of CV CG (I) that is not unambiguously positive is H(I)H
′(I)2ε(I)
N2
Q′′
(
H(I)
N
)
. We assume
that this term is dominated by the other, always positive, terms in the second derivative. Sufficient
conditions are that Q () is the quantile function from the log-normal distribution or the quantile
function from a finite mixture of normals, and that H(I)
N
is sufficiently large; e.g., large enough so
that ifQ () is the quantile function from the lnN
(
µ, σ2
)
distribution,Q∗′′
(
H(I)
N
)
+σ2Q∗′
(
H(I)
N
)2
≥
0, where Q∗ () is the standard normal quantile function.
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The second term is the increment to marginal cost from increasing the number of
people from whom data-use rights with privacy protection ε must be purchased.
As long as the cost function is strictly increasing and convex, the existence and
uniqueness of a solution is guaranteed.
3.1 Competitive Market Equilibrium
Atmarket price pI , consumer i’s willingness to pay for data accuracy will be given
by solving
max
Ii≥0
ηi
(
I˜i + Ii
)− pIIi (8)
where I˜i is the amount of data accuracy provided from the payments by all other
consumers, as noted above. Consumer i’s willingness to pay is non-negative if,
and only if, ηi ≥ pI ; that is, if the marginal utility from increasing I exceeds the
price. If there exists at least one consumer for whom ηi ≥ pI , then the solution to
equation (7) is attained for IV CG > 0.
We next show that there is only one such consumer. It is straightforward to
verify that the consumers are playing a classic free-rider game (Mas-Colell et al.
1995, pp. 361-363). In the competitive equilibrium, the only person willing to pay
for the public good is one with the maximum value of ηi. All others will purchase
zero data accuracy but still consume the data accuracy purchased by this lone
consumer. Specifically, the equilibrium price and data accuracy will satisfy
pI = η¯ =
dCV CG
(
IV CG
)
dI
,
where η¯ is the maximum value of ηi in the population–the taste for accuracy of
the person who desires it the most. However, the Pareto optimal consumption of
14
data accuracy, I0, solves
N∑
i=1
ηi =
dCV CG (I0)
dI
. (9)
Marginal cost is positive,
dCV CG(I0)
dI
> 0, and
∑N
i=1 ηi > η¯; therefore, data ac-
curacy will be under-provided by a competitive supplier when data accuracy
is a public good as long as marginal cost is increasing, which we prove below.
More succinctly, IV CG < I0. Therefore, privacy protection must be over-provided,
εV CG < ε0, by equation (6).13
3.2 The Price-discriminating Monopsonist Provider of Data ac-
curacy
Now consider the problem of a single private data provider who produces sˆwith
accuracy (α, β) using the same technology as in equations (5) and (6). We now
allow the producer to price-discriminate in the acquisition of data-use rights–that
is, the private data-accuracy supplier is a price discriminating monopsonist. This
relaxes the assumptions of the VCG mechanism in GR to allow for the unrealis-
tic possibility that the data accuracy provider knows the population values of γi.
They acknowledge this theoretical possibility when discussing the individual ra-
tionality and dominant-strategy truthful requirements of their mechanism. They
reject it as unrealistic, and we agree. We are considering this possibility to show
that even when the private data-accuracy provider is allowed to acquire data-use
rights with a lower cost strategy than the VCGmechanism, data accuracy will still
13The reader is reminded that a smaller ε implies more privacy protection. It is also worth
commenting that in the GR formulation the single consumer with positive willingness to pay is the
entity running the VCG auction. That person is buying data-use rights from the other consumers,
computing the statistic for publication, then releasing the statistic so that all other consumers may
use it. That is why we have modeled this as a public good. Our formulation is fully consistent
with GR’s scientist seeking data for a grant-supported publication.
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be under-provided.
The producer must decide how many data-use rights (and associated privacy
loss ε, the same value for all i) to purchase from each member of the database,
or, equivalently, how much to charge members of the database to opt out of par-
ticipation in the mechanism for computing the statistic. (They cannot opt out of
the database.) Let π ∈ {0, 1}N be the participation vector. Using the Lindahl ap-
proach, let pLεi be the price that satisfies, for each consumer i,
pLεi ≤ γi,with equality if πi = 1. (10)
Equation (10) says that the Lindahl prices are those such that the choice of ε is
exactly the value that each individual would optimally choose on her own. Even
with our assumption of linear preferences, the Lindahl prices are unique for every
consumer who participates in the mechanism for computing the statistic.
Given a target data accuracy of I = (1 − α), the producer’s cost minimization
problem is the linear program
CL (I) = min
π
(
N∑
i=1
πip
L
εi
)
ε (11)
subject to
N∑
i=1
πi = N − (1− I)N
1/2 + ln (1/β)
and ε =
1/2 + ln (1/β)
(1− I)N .
The solution is for the producer to set πi = 1 for the H members of the database
with the smallest pLεi and πi = 0, otherwise. Note that if
dCL (I)
dI
<
dCV CG(I)
dI
16
for all I , which will be proven in Theorem 1, then the Lindahl purchaser of data-
use rights will produce more data accuracy at any given price of data accuracy
than the VCG purchaser.
By construction, the Lindahl solution satisfies the Pareto optimality criterion
for data-use rights acquisition that
N∑
i=1
πip
L
εi
=
N∑
i=1
πiγi. (12)
Once again, the supplier implements the query response mechanism of equa-
tion (3) with 1/2+ln (1/β)
(1−I)N
-differential privacy and (1 − I, β)-accuracy but pays each
consumer differently for her data-use right. Notice that equation (12) describes
the Pareto optimal privacy loss whether or not one acknowledges that the privacy
protection afforded by ε is non-rival, only partially excludable, and, therefore, also
a public good.
To implement the Lindahl solution, the data producer must be able to exclude
the bits, bi, of specific individuals when computing the statistic, and must have
perfect knowledge of the every marginal disutility γi of increasing ε. When this
information is not available, the producer can, and will, implement the first-best
allocation by choosing a price through the VCG auction mechanism used by GR.
For readers familiar with the data privacy literature, we note that the statement
that technology is given by equations (5) and (6) means that the data custodian
allows the producer to purchase data-use rights with accompanying privacy loss
of ε = 1/2+ln (1/β)
(1−I)N
fromH (I) individuals for the sole purpose of computing sˆ via the
query response mechanism in equation (3) that is 1/2+ln (1/β)
(1−I)N
-differentially private
and achieves (1− I, β)-accuracy, which is exactly what Ghosh and Roth prove.
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3.3 Proof of Suboptimality
Theorem 1 If preferences are given by equation (1), the query response mechanism
satisfies equation (6) for ε-differential privacy with (1− I, β)-accuracy, cost func-
tions satisfy (5) for the VCG mechanism, and (11) for the Lindahl mechanism, the
population distribution of γ is given by Fγ (bounded, absolutely continuous, ev-
erywhere differentiable, and with quantile function Q satisfying the conditions
noted in Section 3), the population distribution of η has bounded support on [0, η¯],
and the population in the database is represented as a continuum with measure
functionH (absolutely continuous, everywhere differentiable, andwith total mea-
sure N) then IV CG < IL and IV CG < I0, where I0 is the Pareto optimal level of
I solving equation (9), IL is the privately-provided level when using the Lindahl
mechanism to procure data-use rights and IV CG is the privately-provided level
when using the VCG procurement mechanism.
Proof. By construction, Fγ(γ) is the distribution of Lindahl prices. Given a
target error bound α, corresponding to data accuracy level I = (1−α), the private
producer must procure data-use rights from the respondents in the confidential
data with ε(I) units of privacy protection from a measure of H(I) individuals.
Define
pℓε = Q
(
H(I)
N
)
,
for ℓ = V CG,L. Note that pℓε is the disutility of privacy loss for the marginal
participant in the VCG and Lindahl mechanisms, respectively. The total cost of
producing I = (1− α) using the VCG mechanism is equation (5):
CV CG(I) = Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)ε(I).
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while the total cost of implementing the Lindahl mechanism is equation (11):
CL(I) =
(
N
∫ Q(H(I)N )
0
γdFγ(γ)
)
ε(I).
Using integration by parts and the properties of the quantile function,
CL(I) =
[
Q
(
H(I)
N
)
Fγ
(
Q
(
H(I)
N
))
−
∫ Q(H(I)N )
0
Fγ(γ)dγ
]
Nε(I)
=
[
Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)−N
∫ Q(H(I)N )
0
Fγ(γ)dγ
]
ε(I).
Differentiating with respect to I ,
dCL(I)
dI
=
[
Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)−N
∫ Q(H(I)N )
0
Fγ(γ)dγ
]
ε′(I) +Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H ′(I)ε(I).
The corresponding expression for CV CG(I) is
dCV CG(I)
dI
= Q
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)ε′(I) +
[
Q
(
H(I)
N
)
+Q′
(
H(I)
N
)
H(I)
N
]
H ′(I)ε(I).
Comparison of the precedingmarginal cost expressions establishes that 0 < dC
L(I)
dI
<
dCV CG(I)
dI
for all I , since N
∫ Q(H(I)N )
0 Fγ(γ)dγ > 0, ε
′(I) > 0, H ′(I) > 0, and Q′ () > 0.
The results stated in the theorem follow by using the equilibrium price for the
private market sale of I , which is pI in equation (1),
pI = η¯ =
dCL(IL)
dI
=
dCV CG(IV CG)
dI
.
Hence, IV CG < IL, since dC
L(IL)
dI
< dC
V CG(IL)
dI
and the conditions on Q imply that
d2CV CG(I)
dI2
> 0. Likewise, IV CG < I0, since
∑N
i=1 ηi > η¯, and
d2CV CG(I)
dI2
> 0.
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4 Conclusion
The concept of differential privacy allows a natural interpretation of privacy pro-
tection as a commodity over which individuals might have preferences. In many
important contexts, privacy protection and data accuracy are not purely private
commodities. When both are public goods, the market allocations might not be
optimal. The solution to the social planning problem that optimally provides both
public goods–data accuracy and privacy protection–delivers more data accuracy,
but less privacy protection, than the VCG mechanism for private-provision of
data. The reason is that the VCG mechanism for procuring data-use rights ig-
nores the public-good nature of the statistics that are published after a citizen sells
the right to use her private data in those publications.
This matters because the demand for public data is greater than ever, while
funding for statistical agencies has been relatively stagnant. It is increasingly
likely that data users will turn to private companies to obtain the information
they demand. Our results suggest that, while the policy debate has centered on
regulating the privacy loss from this trend, it is also important to counterbalance
the demand for privacy against the social value of reliable population statistics.
Abowd and Schmutte (2019) propose a model for determining the optimal bal-
ance between privacy and accuracy in this social choice framework. More re-
search, both theoretical and empirical, will help data users and policy makers
navigate our modern data-rich environment.
The VCG mechanism also underprovides accuracy compared with the ficti-
tious Lindahl mechnanism. We did not identify any relation between optimal
provision and the Lindahl mechanism, suggesting our results are sensitive to the
setup. Our model inherits some limitations (e.g., simple market structure) of the
original GR framework. We also inherit the positive aspects of their model. In par-
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ticular, the results of GR’s Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 are not tied to a specific auction
mechanism.
In concluding, we point out possible extensions of our model. We have as-
sumed a private data custodian must purchase privacy rights in order to use data
in a published statistic. We make this assumption because it reflects the growing
demand that companies be held accountable for the privacy of their customers’
data through increasingly explicit means. However, if we assume companies may
freely use their customers’ data, then our conclusions will likely be reversed, with
privacy being under-provided. To address this possibility, one might consider al-
ternative specifications for the property rights over privacy loss. Similarly, our
model assumes that private firms are limited to the single-buyer model in their
ability to elicit payment from customers for data accuracy. One might explore
alternative formulations of the demand side of the market, including the use of
governmental organizations as the preference aggregators inmaking the purchase
offer. This extension mirrors the original Ghosh-Roth motivation of a researcher
spending grant money to buy the statistic, then placing the result in an open-
access scientific journal. Finally, our model treats the data held by a trusted data
curator as ground truth. Data users concerns for accuracy will likely extend be-
yond our model’s treatment of differential privacy as the focal source of error in
the underlying database. We need better accuracy measurements and tools for
incorporating other sources of error from the data generation process (e.g., edit
constraints, imputation, coverage error) into the social choice problem.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Formal definition of neighboring databases
We can represent any database D by its un-normalized histogram x ∈ Z∗|χ|. The
notation |χ| represents the cardinality of the set χ, from which database entries
(rows) are drawn, and Z∗ is the set of non-negative integers. Each entry in x, xi, is
the number of elements in the database D of type i ∈ χ. The ℓ1 norm of x is
||x||1 =
|χ|∑
i=1
|xi| . (13)
Observe that ||x||1 = N , the number of records in the database. Given two his-
tograms, x and y, ||x − y||1 measures the number of records that differ between
x and y. We define adjacent histograms as those with equal ℓ1 norm and between
which the ℓ1 distance is 2.
If x is the histogram representation of D, y is the histogram representation of
D′, andD′ is constructed fromD by modifying exactly one row, then ||x||1 = ||y||1
and ||x−y||1 = 2. So,D andD′ are adjacent databases and x and y are the adjacent
histogram representations of D and D′, respectively. Some caution is required
when reviewing the related literature because definitions may be stated in terms
of adjacent databases or adjacent histograms.
A.2 Translation of the Ghosh-Roth Model to Our Notation
In this appendix we show that the results in our Section 2, based on the definitions
in the text using database histograms and normalized queries, are equivalent to
the results in Ghosh and Roth (2015). In what follows, definitions and theorems
tagged GR refer to the original Ghosh and Roth (GR, hereafter) paper. Untagged
App. 1
definitions and theorems refer to our results in the text.
GRmodel a databaseD ∈ {0, 1}n where there is a single bit, bi, taking values in
{0, 1} for a population of individuals i = 1, . . . , n. In GR-Definition 2.1, they define
a query release mechanismA (D), a randomized algorithm that maps {0, 1}n → R,
as εi-differentially private if for all measurable subsets S of R and for any pair of
databases D andD(i) such that H
(
D,D(i)
)
= 1
Pr [A (D) ∈ S]
Pr [A (D(i)) ∈ S] ≤ e
εi
where H
(
D,D(i)
)
is the Hamming distance betweenD andD(i). Notice that their
use of the Hamming distance to define neighboring databases is consistent with
our use of “bounded” differential privacy. However, this is not the standard defi-
nition of ε-differential privacy, which they take from Dwork et al. (2006), because
a “worst-case” extremum is not included. The parameter εi is specific to individ-
ual i. The amount of privacy loss algorithm A permits for individual i, whose bit
bi is the one that is toggled in D
(i), is potentially different from the privacy loss
allowed for individual j 6= i, whose privacy loss may be εj > εi from the same
algorithm. In this case, individual j could also achieve εj-differentially privacy if
the parameter εi were substituted for εj . To refine this definition so that it also cor-
responds to an extremum with respect to each individual, GR-Definition 2.1 adds
the condition that algorithm A is εi-minimally differentially private with respect to
individual i if
εi = arg inf
ε
{
Pr [A (D) ∈ S]
Pr [A (D(i)) ∈ S] ≤ e
ε
}
,
which means that for individual i, the level of differential privacy afforded by
the algorithm A (D) is the smallest value of ε for which algorithm A achieves ε-
differential privacy for individual i. In GR εi-differentially private always means
App. 2
εi-minimally differentially private.
GR-Fact 1, stated without proof, but see Dwork and Roth (2014, p. 42-43 ) for
a proof, says that εi-minimal differential privacy composes. That is, if algorithm
A (D) is εi-minimally differentially private, T ⊂ {1, . . . , n} , and D,D(T ) ∈ {0, 1}n
with H
(
D,D(T )
)
= |T |, then
Pr [A (D) ∈ S]
Pr [A (D(T )) ∈ S] ≤ e
{∑i∈T εi},
where D(T ) differs from D only on the indices in T .
In the population, the statistic of interest is an unnormalized query
s =
n∑
i=1
bi.
The εi-minimally differentially private algorithm A (D) delivers an output sˆ that
is a noisy estimate of s, where the noise is induced by randomness in the query
release mechanism embedded in A. Each individual in the population when of-
fered a payment pi > 0 in exchange for the privacy loss εi > 0 computes an
individual privacy cost equal to υiεi, where υi > 0, p ≡ (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn+, and υ ≡
(υ1, . . . , υn) ∈ Rn+.
GR define a mechanism M as a function that maps Rn+ × {0, 1}n → R × Rn+
using an algorithm A (D) that is εi (υ)-minimally differentially private to deliver
a query response sˆ ∈ R and a vector of payments p (υ) ∈ Rn+. GR-Definition 2.4
defines individually rational mechanisms. GR-Definition 2.5 defines dominant-
strategy truthful mechanisms. An individually rational, dominant-strategy truth-
ful mechanism M provides individual i with utility pi (υ) − υiεi (υ) ≥ 0 and
pi (υ) − υiεi (υ) ≥ pi
(
υ˜i, υ′i
) − υiεi (υ˜i, υ′i) for all υ′i ∈ Rn+, where υ˜i is the vec-
tor υ with element υi removed.
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GR define k-accuracy in GR-Definition 2.6 using the deviation |sˆ− s| from the
output sˆ produced by algorithm A (D) using mechanismM as
Pr [|sˆ− s| ≥ k] ≤ 1
3
.
where we have reversed the direction of the inequalities and taken the comple-
mentary probability to show that this is the unnormalized version of our Defi-
nition 3 for a query sequence of length 1. GR also define the normalized query
accuracy level as α, which is identical to our usage in Definition 3.
GR-Theorem 3.1 uses the GR definitions of εi-minimal differential privacy, k-
accuracy, and GR-Fact 1 composition to establish that any differentially private
mechanism M that is
(
αn
4
)
-accurate must purchase privacy loss of at least εi ≥
1
αn
from at least H ≥ (1− α)n individuals in the population. GR-Theorem 3.3
establishes the existence of a differentially private mechanism that is
(
1
2
+ ln 3
)
αn-
accurate and selects a set of individuals H ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with εi = 1αn for all i ∈ H
and |H| = (1− α)n.
In order to understand the implications of GR-Theorems 3.1 and 3.3 and our ar-
guments about the public-good properties of differential privacy, consider the ap-
plication of GR-Definition 2.3 (Lap (σ) noise addition) to construct an ε-differentially
private response to the counting query based on GR-Theorem 3.3 with |H| =
(1− α)n and the indices ordered such that H = {1, . . . , |H|}. The resulting an-
swer from the query response mechanism is
sˆ =
H∑
i=1
bi +
αn
2
+ Lap
(
1
ε
)
,
which is the counting query version of equation (3) in the text. Note the bias cor-
rection term αn/2 is adjusted in equation (3) as necessitated by our use of
(
α, 1
3
)
-
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accuracy. Because of GR-Theorem 3.3, we can use a common ε = 1
αn
in equation
(3).
If this were not true, then we would have to consider query release mecha-
nisms that had different values of ε for each individual in the population and
therefore the value that enters equation (3) would be much more complicated. To
ensure that each individual in H received εi-minimally differential privacy, the
algorithm would have to use the smallest εi that was produced for any individ-
ual. In addition, the FairQuery and MinCostAuction algorithms described next
would not work because they depend upon being able to order the cost functions
υiεi by υi, which is not possible unless εi is a constant or υi and εi are perfectly
positively correlated. Effectively, GR-Theorem 3.3 proves that achieving (α, β)-
accuracy with ε-differential privacy requires a mechanism in which everyone who
sells a data-use right gets the best protection (minimum εi over all i ∈ H) offered
to anyone in the analysis sample. If a change in the algorithm’s parameters results
in a lower minimum εi, everyone who opts to use the new parameterization re-
ceives this improvement. In addition, we argue in the text that when such mech-
anisms are used by a government agency they are also non-excludable because
exclusion from the database violates equal protection provisions of the laws that
govern these agencies.
Next, GR analyze algorithms that achieve O (an)-accuracy by purchasing ex-
actly 1
αn
units of privacy loss from exactly (1− α)n individuals. Their algorithms
FairQuery andMinCostAuction have the same basic structure:
• Sort the individuals in increasing order of their privacy cost, υ1 ≤ υ2 ≤ . . . ≤
υn.
• Find the cut-off value υk that either exhausts a budget constraint (FairQuery)
or meets an accuracy constraint (MinCostAuction).
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• Assign the set H = {1, . . . , k} .
• Calculate the statistic sˆ using a differentially private algorithm that adds
Laplace noise with just enough dispersion to achieve the required differen-
tial privacy for the privacy loss purchased from the members of H .
• Pay all members of H the same amount, a function of υk+1; pay all others
nothing.
To complete the summary of GR, we note that GR-Theorem 4.1 establishes that
FairQuery is dominant-strategy truthful and individually rational. GR-Proposition
4.4 establishes that FairQuery maximizes accuracy for a given total privacy pur-
chase budget in the class of all dominant-strategy truthful, individually rational,
envy-free, fixed-purchase mechanisms. GR-Proposition 4.5 proves that their al-
gorithm MinCostAuction is a VCG mechanism that is dominant-strategy truth-
ful, individually rational and O (αn)-accurate. GR-Theorem 4.6 provides a lower
bound on the total cost of purchasing k units of privacy of kυk+1 GR-Theorem 5.1
establishes that for υ ∈ Rn+, no individually rational mechanism can protect the
privacy of valuations υ with (k, β)-accuracy for k < n
2
.
In our application of GR, we use N as the total population. Our γi is identical
to the GR υi. We define the query as a normalized query, which means that query
accuracy is defined in terms of α instead of k; hence, our implementation of the
VCGmechanism achieves (α, β)where the inclusion of β generalizes GR’s implicit
restriction to β = 1
3
in their accuracy definition. We define the individual amount
of privacy loss in the same manner as GR.
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